Sovereignty Sold Out – This Picture Was Painted in the Past

Though the terms Environmentalism, Piecemeal Functionalism, and Continual Emergency Regime have been household words for me for some twenty years now. Yet I’m reminded daily at how few people from street to suit are aware of these issues, or their relationship to one another, even at this late hour.

The changes related to the above terms are not ad hoc. Instead are discussing  matters designed, mapped out and published years ago.

In 1970 Zbigniew Brzezinski said in his book, “Between Two Ages”, that
“national sovereignty is no longer a viable concept”
and suggested a
piecemeal “movement toward a larger community of the developed nations – through
a variety of indirect ties and already developing limitations on national
sovereignty.”

Piecemeal Functionalism was then implemented to do just as Gardner (in article below) recommended.  The result will be buzzing confusion — deliberately undetectable.   Zbigniew Brezenski, National Security Advisor to President Carter, CFR member and first Director of the Trilateral Commission detailed this principal:

Coalitions of specialists [Technocracy; Wise Men] can be built across national borders in specific areas, blunting the nationalism that otherwise might hinder agreement.

The 2005 ConFab Conference Banff Springs Hotel and the G8/G20 Meeting in  Toronto 2010 are part of this Piecemeal Functionalism.

‘Notice the date in the article below’ :

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

April 1974

The Hard Road to World Order

Richard N. Gardner

Volume 52 • Number 3

The contents of Foreign Affairs are copyrighted.

 1974 Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. All rights reserved.

“It  was  the  best  of times it was worst of times.”  What

Dickens wrote of the last quarter of the 18th century fits

the present period all too well. The quest for a world

structure that secures peace, advances human rights and provides

the conditions for economic progress — for what is loosely called

world order — has never seemed more frustrating but at the same

time strangely hopeful.

Certainly the gap has never loomed larger between the objec-

tives and the capacities of the international organizations that

were supposed to get mankind on the road to world order. We

are witnessing an outbreak of shortsighted nationalism that seems

oblivious to the economic, political and moral implications of in-

terdependence. Yet never has there been such widespread recog-

nition by the world’s intellectual leadership [Technocrats] of the necessity for

cooperation and planning on a truly global basis, beyond country,

beyond region, especially beyond social system. Never has there

been such an extraordinary growth in the constructive potential

of transnational private organizations — not just multinational

corporations but international associations of every kind in which

like-minded persons around the world weave effective patterns

of global action. And never have we seen such an impressive ar-

ray of ongoing negotiations aimed at the cooperative manage-

ment of global problems. To familiar phrases like the “popula-

tion explosion” and the “communications explosion” we should

now add the “negotiation explosion.”

What is “worst” about our times for those who wish for rapid

progress toward world order is clear enough. The United Na-

tions is very far from being able to discharge the responsibilities

assigned by its Charter for the maintenance of international peace

and security. The willingness of U.N. members to risk their

short-term interests for the good of the community seems at the

level of the frontier town in High Noon, where the citizens aban-

doned their lawman as soon as the outlaw was released from jail.

If a clear and unambiguous case of aggression came before the

Security Council or General Assembly today, there would be

little confidence that a majority of members would treat it as such

or come to the aid of the victim. The Charter concept of collec-

THE HARD ROAD TO WORLD ORDER 557

tive security is obviously dead; even for consent-type “peace-

keeping,” little progress has been made in devising agreed con-

stitutional and financial arrangements. Nor are the world’s

principal economic forums in much better shape. In contrast to

the accomplishments of happier days, nobody now takes a major

issue to ECOSOC, UNCTAD, GATT, IMF or OECD 1 with

much hope for a constructive result. Even the European Com-

munity threatens to unravel under current economic and political

pressures.

In this unhappy state of affairs, few people retain much con-

fidence in the more ambitious strategies for world order that had

wide backing a generation ago — “world federalism/’ “charter

review,” and “world peace through world law.” The consensus

on basic values and willingness to entrust vital interests to com-

munity judgment clearly do not exist. One need only picture a

world constitutional convention including Messrs. Nixon, Brezh-

nev, Mao, Brandt, Pompidou, Castro, Peron, and Qaddafi, not

to mention Mmes. Golda Meir and Indira Gandhi. What rules

or procedures for world government could they agree upon?

The same considerations suggest the doubtful utility of holding

a Charter review conference. To amend the U.N. Charter re-

quires the approval of two-thirds of the membership, including

all of the five Permanent Members. If one examines carefully

the attitude of U.N. members to specific proposals, one quickly

discovers that the most likely consequence of wholesale revision

of the Charter would be to diminish rather than enhance the

strength of the organization. As in the case of the U.S. Constitu-

tion, we are more likely to make progress by pressing the existing

instrument to the outer limits of its potentialities through crea-

tive use, seeking amendments only on carefully selected matters

where they seem both necessary and capable of adoption by the

constitutionally required majority.

Just as world federalism and charter review now seem bank-

rupt of possibilities, so does the old-fashioned idea of achieving

“world peace through world law” by means of a greatly strength-

ened International Court of Justice. The members of the United

Nations seem less willing than ever to entrust vital interests for

1 Respectively, to give their full names, the Economic and Social Council, the United

Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the General Agreement on Tariffs and

Trade, the International Monetary Fund, and the Organization for Economic Co-operation

and Development.

558 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

decision to the 15 men at The Hague, as may be seen from the

very few countries that are willing to accept the Court’s compul-

sory jurisdiction without crippling reservations. In the two cases

now before the Court— one involving the “cod war” between

Iceland and the United Kingdom, the other the French nuclear

tests in the Pacific— the “defendant” countries, Iceland and

France, have even refused to appear. In part, this reluctance to

accept the Court’s jurisdiction reflects lack of confidence in the

competence and independence of some of its judges, but even if

all of them had the intellectual and moral qualities of Solon of

Athens the deeper problem would still remain. Nations are reluc-

tant to risk adverse judgments at the hands of third parties they

cannot control; moreover, they are reluctant to commit them-

selves to have their controversies decided according to rules of

international law that may be of doubtful legitimacy, incapable

of alteration as circumstances change, and uncertain of general

enforcement.

If instant world government, Charter review, and a greatly

strengthened International Court do not provide the answers,

what hope for progress is there? The answer will not satisfy those

who seek simple solutions to complex problems, but it comes

down essentially to this: The hope for the foreseeable future lies,

not in building up a few ambitious central institutions of univer-

sal membership and general jurisdiction as was envisaged at the

end of the last war, but rather in the much more decentralized,

disorderly and pragmatic process of inventing or adapting insti-

tutions of limited jurisdiction and selected membership to deal

with specific problems on a case-by-case basis, as the necessity for

cooperation is perceived by the relevant nations. Such institutions

of limited jurisdiction will have a better chance of doing what

must be done to make a “rule of law” possible among nations —

providing methods for changing the law and enforcing it as it

changes and developing the perception of common interests that

is the prerequisite for successful cooperation.

In short, the “house of world order” will have to be built from

the bottom up rather than from the top down. It will look like

a great “booming, buzzing confusion,” to use William James’

famous description of reality, but an end run around national

sovereignty, eroding it piece by piece, will accomplish much

more than the old-fashioned frontal assault. Of course, for polit-

ical as well as administrative reasons, some of these specialized

THE HARD ROAD TO WORLD ORDER 559

arrangements should be brought into an appropriate relationship

with the central institutions of the U.N, system, but the main

thing is that the essential functions be performed.

The question is whether this more modest approach can do the

job. Can it really bring mankind into the twenty-first century

with reasonable prospects for peace, welfare and human dignity?

The argument thus far suggests it better had, for there seems to

be no alternative. But the evidence also suggests some grounds

for cautious optimism.

II

The hopeful aspect of the present situation is that even as na-

tions resist appeals for “world government” and u the surrender

of sovereignty,” technological, economic and political interests

are forcing them to establish more and more far-reaching ar-

rangements to manage their mutual interdependence. It is

instructive to ponder the institutional implications of the negotia-

tions to which nations were already committed before the “en-

ergy crisis” preempted international attention in the fall of 1973.

Although some of these tasks of institution-building may be com-

plicated or postponed by the energy problem, all are now con-

tinuing fixtures on the diplomatic agenda :

1. The non-Communist nations are embarked on a long-term

negotiation for the reform of the international monetary system,

aimed at developing a new system of reserves and settlements to

replace the dollar standard and at improving the balance-of-pay-

ments adjustment process. The accomplishment of these objec-

tives would almost surely require a revitalization of the Interna-

tional Monetary Fund, which would have unprecedented powers

to create new international reserves and to influence national de-

cisions on exchange rates and on domestic monetary and fiscal

policies. Such a strengthened IMF might be given power to back

its decisions by meaningful multilateral sanctions, such as uni-

form surcharges on the exports of uncooperative surplus coun-

tries and the withholding of multilateral and bilateral credits and

reserve facilities from recalcitrant deficit countries.

2. Roughly the same wide group of nations is launched on a

parallel effort to rewrite the ground rules for the conduct of

international trade. Among other things, we will be seeking new

rules in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to cover a

whole range of hitherto unregulated nontariff barriers. These

560 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

will subject countries to an unprecedented degree of international

surveillance over up to now sacrosanct “domestic” policies, such

as farm price supports, subsidies, and government procurement

practices that have transnational effects. New standards are also

envisaged to regulate protectionist measures to cope with “mar-

ket disruption” from imports. To make these new rules of the

game meaningful, GATT arrangements for consultation, con-

ciliation and enforcement of its decisions will have to be greatly

improved. Moreover, as will be discussed, the energy and food

crises have stimulated a new concern about access to raw materi-

als and a clear need for new ground rules on export controls.

3. The trend in recent years has been toward a steady increase

in the resources of the multilateral development and technical

assistance agencies, in contrast to static or declining bilateral

efforts. This should enhance the authority of the World Bank,

the regional development banks and the U.N. Development Pro-

gram over the economic policies of rich and poor nations. By

the end of this decade, a portion of aid funds may be channeled

to international agencies from sources independent of national

decision-making — many have proposed some form of “link” be-

tween monetary reserve creation and development aid and some

arrangement for the payment to international agencies of fees

from the exploitation of seabed mineral resources.

4. The next few years should see a continued strengthening of

the new global and regional agencies charged with protecting the

world’s environment. In addition to comprehensive monitoring

of the earth’s air, water and soil and of the effects of pollutants

on human health, we can look forward to new procedures to im-

plement the principle of state responsibility for national actions

that have transnational environmental consequences, probably

including some kind of “international environmental impact

statement” procedure by which at least some nations agree to

have certain kinds of environmental decisions reviewed by inde-

pendent scientific authorities. At the same time, international

agencies will be given broader powers to promulgate and revise

standards limiting air and ocean pollution.

5. We are entering a wholly new phase of international con-

cern and international action on the population problem, drama-

tized by the holding this year of the first World Population Con-

ference to take place at the political level. By the end of this

decade, a majority of nations are likely to have explicit popula-

THE HARD ROAD TO WORLD ORDER 561

tion policies, many of them designed to achieve zero population

growth by a specific target date. These national policies and

targets will be established and implemented in most cases with

the help of international agencies. Under their auspices, several

billions of dollars in national and international resources will be

mobilized in fulfillment of a basic human rights objective already

proclaimed by the United Nations in General Assembly Resolu-

tion 2542 (XXIV) — that every family in the world should be

given “the knowledge and means necessary to determine freely

and responsibly the number and spacing of their children.”

6. Belatedly, a World Food Conference has been scheduled to

deal with the long-neglected problem of assuring sufficient food

supplies for the world’s rapidly growing population. As reserves

of food and arable land dwindle under the impact of crop fail-

ures and disappointing fish harvests, there is mounting concern

about “world food security.” The Conference is likely to result

in efforts to expand agricultural productivity, assure the mainte-

nance of adequate food reserves, and food aid.

7. In the 1974 Law of the Sea Conference and beyond — in

what may be several years of very difficult negotiations — there

should eventually emerge a new international regime governing

the world’s oceans. New law is, all agree, urgently needed on

such crucial matters as the territorial sea, passage through inter-

national straits, fisheries, the exploitation of the mineral resources

of the seabed, the regulation of marine pollution, and the conduct

of scientific research. To make these new rules of law meaningful,

there will have to be tough provisions to assure compliance as

well as to provide for the compulsory settlement of disputes. The

regulatory responsibilities of the new oceans agency are likely to

exceed those of any existing international organization.

8. As the INTELSAT conference has foreshadowed, and in

accordance with responsibilities already lodged in principle in the

International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the United

Nations, new rules and institutions will almost certainly be

created to regulate emerging communication technologies, no-

tably direct broadcasting from satellites. While providing some

safeguards against the unwanted intrusion of foreign broadcasts,

these arrangements will aim to maximize the potential for using

satellite communications to promote trade and economic develop-

ment as well as world culture and understanding. Ways will very

likely be found to give the United Nations and other interna-

562 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

tional agencies access to this new technology for both operational

and informational purposes. The ITU and other agencies will

probably be given new powers to allocate radio frequencies and

satellite parking orbits among users.

All these are cases where negotiations are already underway

or scheduled for the near future. In addition, one could add two

other items that have already been, one might have said, negoti-

ated to death over the years; nonetheless they are so absolutely

critical that progress simply must be made — and nations must

come to know this.

9. At some point in the years ahead the world will move be-

yond U.S. -Soviet agreement on strategic weapons, and NATO-

Warsaw Pact agreement on some measure of force reduction, to

a truly multilateral set of negotiations (comparable to the non-

proliferation treaty) designed to limit conventional weapons. It

seems inevitable that the United Nations and perhaps regional

bodies will be given new responsibilities for the administration

of these arms control and disarmament measures, including

means of verification and enforcement.

10. And finally, despite the constitutional impasse over U.N.

peacekeeping, there will in practice be increasing resort to U.N.

forces to contain local conflicts. The arguments over authoriza-

tion, financing and operational control will be resolved on a case-

by-case basis where the interests of key countries converge, as

they have already in the launching of the United Nations Emer-

gency Force in the Middle East. With the United States, the

Soviet Union and China each behaving “more like a country and

less like a cause,” some principles for mutual noninterference

in the internal affairs of other countries are likely to be worked

out, either bilaterally or under U.N. auspices. A corollary of

such agreements will be international peacekeeping arrangements

to patrol borders, supervise elections and verify compliance with

nonintervention norms.

Does this list read like a decalogue, more convincing as a state-

ment of what nations ought to do in the pursuit of their enlight-

ened self-interest than as a prediction of what they actually will

do? Let the reader who has this impression go back over the ten

items. Admittedly, there is not a one of these specialized negotia-

tions that could not be wrecked and brought to nothing by the

same forces of shortsighted nationalism that have crippled the

central institutions of the United Nations. But is it not a totally

THE HARD ROAD TO WORLD ORDER 563

hardheaded prediction that we shall see very substantial changes

in the great majority of these areas by the end of the decade?

The reason is simple : for most, perhaps eventually all, of the

subjects, failure is simply not an acceptable alternative to deci-

sive coalitions of nations. Felt necessity is often not strong enough

to command assent to general principles with unpredictable ap-

plications; but it can lead to agreement on specific measures and

regulations.

In short, the case-by-case approach can produce some remark-

able concessions of “sovereignty” that could not be achieved on

an across-the-board basis. The Soviet Union, China and the

United States may be unable to agree on the general rules that

should cover U.N. peacekeeping in all unspecified future con-

tingencies, but they may well agree on a U.N. peacekeeping

force to secure a permanent Middle East settlement that is other-

wise satisfactory to them. The same three countries are unlikely

to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court

of Justice over all disputes to which they might be parties, but

they may very well agree upon effective third-party machinery

for compulsory settlement of disputes on the specific subjects

dealt with in a new Law of the Sea agreement — where they

recognize compelling national interests in getting other nations

as well as themselves to comply with the rules. Thus, while we

will not see “world government” in the old-fashioned sense of a

single all-embracing global authority, key elements of planetary

planning and planetary management will come about on those

very specific problems where the facts of interdependence force

nations, in their enlightened self-interest, to abandon unilateral

decision-making in favor of multilateral processes.

Connecting the Dots: From the United Nations to Your State Government

http://canadafreepress.com/index.php/article/54501

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